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Abstract The historical experience of colonialism exerts a profound influence upon
emergent postcolonial societies. Yet colonial legacies are not passed on in precisely
the same way; rather, they are contingent on particular historical processes. In the
case of Korea, Japanese colonialism gave way to a brief liberation phase that was
followed by another foreign occupation (the U.S. in the south and the U.S.S.R. in the
north) during which efforts were made to rebuild the political community. Focusing
on the 1946 people’s uprisings, the largest popular social movement during the U.S.
occupation period, as a pivotal historical event, this article examines why the
primary target of the uprisings was not the foreign military government but fellow
Koreans, especially police officers, bureaucrats, and wealthy landlords, thereby
revealing how Japanese colonial rule influenced the movement’s choice of targets as
well as its eventual failure. Through this historical analysis, I demonstrate that
internal conflicts among Koreans, which were created and rearticulated through
Japanese colonial rule, became critical sources of social and political struggles
under the American occupation, the important consequence of which lies in the
creation of a pattern of internal exclusion that characterized South Korea’s post-war
political trajectory.
*****
On my way from work, I saw a lot of stuff piled in the street and people surrounding
it. It was a high-ranking government employee’s house, who’d lost favor with the
people during the Japanese colonial period. They searched his house and found a lot
of rice, sugar, and cotton fabric. This kind of stuff was really precious back then.
People didn’t take the stuff for themselves but put it in the street and shouted ‘see
this, now people are poorly clothed and suffering from hunger, and this son of bitch
is living well against the people.’ They cursed him and shouted he should be beaten
to death.
On October 1, 1946, Taegu, a city in the North Kyo˘ngsang Province
in Korea, became a center of protest, where women and children
went to the city hall to demand rice, and sympathetic union
workers and students gathered at the railroad station. As people
took over the police station, attacks against policemen and
government officials emerged, and martial law was proclaimed. The
statement quoted above (Kang interview with author, May 7, 2008)
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describes an incident that took place in the evening of October 2 in
Taegu, and testifies to how people expressed their collective griev-
ances against government officials who served the Japanese during
the colonial era and then the U.S. for the occupation period. After
the political upheaval in the Kyo˘ngsang provinces, uprisings took
place sporadically in other provinces as well until mid-December.
The uprisings took a surprising direction given the nearly four
decades of oppressive Japanese colonial rule in Korea (1910-
August 1945), which was followed by a brief liberation phase
(August-September 1945) before the American occupation period
(September 1945–1948). Having thrown off one foreign oppressor
(Japan) only to be occupied by another (U.S.), the uprisings in 1946
did not target the American occupiers but rather fellow Koreans,
especially police officers, bureaucrats, and wealthy landlords. Why
was the primary target of the uprisings not the foreign military
government but other Koreans? And, what does this suggest about
the impact of Japanese colonialism on the movement’s choice of
targets as well as its eventual failure?
Historical Context
Korea was under Japanese colonial rule after it became a protec-
torate in 1905 and was formally annexed to Japan in 1910 until the
Japanese defeat in World War II terminated the prolonged colonial
rule in 1945. The liberation from oppressive colonial domination
was immediately followed by the widespread development of
various political organizations and voluntary social associations
both at the local and national levels, reflecting and accelerating
popular political participation. When two occupation forces subse-
quently entered Korea (the U.S. in the south and the Soviet Union
in the north), however, efforts to reconstruct an independent
national community had to face yet another form of foreign inter-
vention by these external powers.
To the extent that terminating the coercive Japanese colonial rule
intensified political and social aspirations for an independent state,
and that the existence of the American Military Government (here-
after AMG) could impede the establishment of a sovereign nation-
state, one might have expected the emergence of a national
movement against the AMG. Surprisingly, however, no major
national movements arose against the military rule. Although the
AMG increased economic, political, and ideological tensions
through a series of institutional changes, American military rule
itself never became a primary target for popular struggles through-
out the occupation period. In fact, social movements through which
people directly attacked the military government comprised only
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about two percent of all social movements during the occupation
period (Yi 1988: 231). Instead, Koreans tended to engage in violent
collective actions against their fellow Koreans. People who once
mobilized a nation-wide social movement in order to secure their
national community from an external threat in the pre-colonial
period and who resisted the oppressive colonial domination during
the Japanese colonial period struggled against each other under
the U.S. military occupation. Why?
It should be noted that Japanese colonial rule and the American
occupation had significantly different historical contexts, and the
ways in which they were viewed by the general public were, there-
fore, contrasting. While Japan was perceived as an illegitimate
appropriator of an existing national community, resulting in strong
resistance to its colonial rule even before its official launch in
Korea, the U.S. occupation was enthusiastically accepted by most
people including leftist activists precisely because it brought about
political independence from Japanese colonial domination. For the
Korean people, Japan appeared as an oppressor, whereas the U.S.
was seen as a liberator, at least in the early occupation period.
This does not mean, however, that the general public continued
to hold these positive attitudes toward the U.S. throughout the
occupation period. What Koreans ultimately wanted from the U.S.
was its assistance for rebuilding an independent nation-state, not
another foreign rule. When the AMG announced itself as the only
legitimate government, attempted to crush popular social and
political organizations, and significantly exacerbated existing poor
economic conditions, people came to perceive that “the liberators
had become the oppressors” (Meade 1951: 62). Under these cir-
cumstances, it is understandable that strong acceptance could be
converted into even stronger resistance against the AMG. Yet, the
historical record is more complex and points instead to the inten-
sification of the economic, political, and ideological struggles that
divided the Korean people and fueled the opposition to their new
“oppressors.” The intensification of internal conflicts among Korean
people under the AMG, then, needs to be explained rather than
taken for granted.
Through analyzing the causes and consequences of the 1946
people’s uprisings,1 this article examines why the primary target of
the uprisings was not the foreign military government but rather
other Koreans, and how the historical experience of Japanese colo-
nial rule influenced the movement’s choice of targets as well as its
eventual failure. To this end, it focuses on the ways in which social
boundaries among Korean people, which were redrawn through
Japanese colonialism, played a crucial role in shaping a particular
political trajectory in the liberation and occupation periods. In
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doing so, it aims to illuminate the effects of colonial legacies upon
the reconstruction of the postcolonial community in South Korea.
Colonial Legacies in the Process of Postcolonial
State Formation
As social scientists become more interested in colonialism, schol-
arly attention has been directed to the study of colonial legacies in
postcolonial societies, with a particular focus on how the establish-
ment of the colonial state and different forms of colonial rule
left imprints upon political changes and state formation in postco-
lonial societies (e.g. Davidson 1992; Lange 2003, 2004; Mamdani
1996, 2003; Migdal 1988; Young 1994). One critical issue in (post)
colonial studies is related to how different methods of colonial
domination–in the form of direct or indirect rule–promoted particu-
lar forms of political change during postcolonial periods. Among
others, Matthew Lange (2004: 906–08) argues that while the colo-
nial state under direct rule tends to base its political domination
upon a centralized administrative structure, thus promoting the
rule of law, indirect rule consolidates the institutional and sub-
stantial power of chiefs as local intermediaries between the colonial
administration and indigenous people, hence generating the ten-
dency for despotism. These contrasting institutional legacies can be
seen, for example, by comparing political changes in postcolonial
India and Africa. Through the British colonial rule, India developed
popular political culture as well as the infrastructural power of the
state and consequently followed a democratic trajectory (Young
1994: 272–75; see Kohli 1990). In contrast, more coercive and
extractive colonial rules in Africa gave rise to clientelism and trib-
alism that largely hindered political participation of the masses in
postcolonial Africa (Davidson 1992; Mamdani 1996, 2003; Young
1994).
Mahmood Mamdani (1996) further elaborates the political legacy
of indirect rule in the context of colonial and postcolonial Africa.
Mamdani shows how the British and French imperial powers uti-
lized the native authorities in the local state for effective colonial
rule and generated “decentralized despotism” by providing the
chiefdom with omnipotent power encompassing the judicial, legis-
lative, executive, and administrative realms. Characterizing the
colonial state as a “bifurcated state,” Mamdani stresses that colo-
nial rule produced a civic-communitarian division through which
white settlers and a few Africans had been endowed with freedom
and rights as citizens, while most Africans remained tribal subjects
in the realm of rural communities. The gist of Mamdani’s argument
is that indirect rule implanted by the Western imperial powers in
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Africa consolidated the political power of tribal authorities, which is
chiefly responsible for the development of ethnic conflicts and
authoritarianism in the postcolonial period. Thus Mamdani (1996:
25) ultimately claims that the most important institutional legacy of
colonial rule in Africa lies in the continent’s inherited impediments
to democratization.
Mamdani’s work has enhanced our understanding of colonial
legacy by illuminating the historical continuity between institutional
political settings in the colonial period and political structures in
postcolonial Africa. Yet, the way in which colonial legacies influence
postcolonial politics remains contested. Frederick Cooper (2005: 18,
51–52), for example, criticizes Mamdani for ignoring the pivotal role
of sequential processes in the political changes in postcolonial
Africa. The problem of Mamdani’s account, Cooper claims, lies in the
fact that it makes a direct causal connection between forms of
colonial rule during the 1920s and 1930s, on the one hand, and the
postcolonial era of the 1980s and 1990s, on the other, while neglect-
ing important political developments in the intervening period. To fill
this gap, Cooper underscores the existence of effective mobilization
of Africans for making claims to citizenship in the late 1940s and
1950s. Examining labormovements in the post-war period in French
Africa, he shows how the Africans appropriated the languages of
equality, citizenship, and claims-making within the imperial system,
which in turn propelled the ousting of French colonial power and the
opening of sources of political conflicts in the postcolonial era. Thus
Cooper demonstrates that “the process of decolonization, not just the
heritage of colonialism, shaped the patterns of postcolonial politics”
(2005: 230, emphasis in original).
As the debate over Mamdani’s work clearly shows, Mamdani and
Cooper have developed contrasting, seemingly irreconcilable argu-
ments about the politics of postcolonial Africa. The fact that they
have different foci, however, does not necessarily mean that we
need to choose one argument over the other. Rather, it is necessary
to integrate both points of view to the extent that the reproduction
of the colonial legacy itself is a product of political processes in
postcolonial periods. It might be possible to combine Mamdani’s
and Cooper’s arguments by explaining why and how institutional
and political structures that were formed in a colonial situation
remained largely intact in spite of the existence of popular efforts to
democratize politics during postcolonial periods. In this regard, a
more “process-centered” approach (Migdal 2001) is necessary for
elucidating historical continuities or discontinuities from colonial
to postcolonial periods.
Focusing on the largely neglected case of Japanese colonialism
and its legacies in postcolonial politics in Korea, this article aims to
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develop a process-centered approach in order to show why and how
colonial state structure was revived through the process of popular
struggles. To this end, it advances two theoretical arguments. First,
it highlights the pivotal role in postcolonial politics of internal
conflicts that were created and reformulated among indigenous
people through colonial rule. One theoretical problem in colonial
studies stems from the widely accepted conceptual dichotomies of
colonizer vs. colonized, civilized vs. primitive, and imperial citizen
vs. colonial subject. As scholars have noted (Stoler and Cooper
1997; Prakash 1995; Young 1995), this binary conceptual distinc-
tion, especially between colonizer and colonized, is problematic
rather than constructive. Certainly, the imposition of colonial rule
tends to promote confrontation between the colonial power and
colonized people, most notably in the form of anti-colonial nation-
alist movements. Yet, it is questionable to assume that indigenous
people maintain the essential characteristics of their own collectiv-
ity throughout a colonial period without any changes (Goswami
2004: 24–25). And, underlying this assumption is the dominant
view that colonized people share and reproduce the same identity
and a unitary collective form. By exclusively focusing on differ-
ences, therefore, the dichotomy between colonizer and colonized
seems to homogenize both groups. In doing so, it obscures the fact
that various social groups within the indigenous people respond to
and interact with the colonial power in significantly different ways
(see Isaacman and Isaacman 1977).2 To the extent that many
postcolonial societies experienced internal political and social con-
flict during the process of postcolonial state-building, it is impor-
tant to consider how various social groups interacted differently
with colonial powers, and how this in turn led to the development
of contentious relationships among indigenous people.
The problem with focusing on the difference between colonizer
and colonized is clearly revealed in the case of Korea. The puzzling
situation in Korea under American occupation can be seen through
the existence of intensive and continuous internal struggles. As the
distinction between colonizer and colonized implies, if the Korean
people had maintained the same collective interests and identity
throughout the Japanese colonial period, they would have engaged
in national integration, whether against or with the help of the
AMG, to achieve the national goal of an independent sovereign
nation-state. The fact that political disputes among Koreans in the
aftermath of Japanese colonial rule were often about the meaning
of “collaboration” with the Japanese, however, indicates that a
major source of internal conflicts stemmed from relationships with
the Japanese colonial power. This suggests that the historical expe-
rience of Japanese colonialism drew boundaries not only between
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colonizer and colonized but also among the colonized people them-
selves. Therefore, it is critical to examine why and how internal
boundaries among the Korean people, which were reformulated
with the mediation of the colonial state, played an important role in
the process of postcolonial state formation.
In addition to taking internal boundaries more seriously, this
analysis offers a second theoretical contribution by advancing a
process-centered view of postcolonial state formation as it impacts
the reconstruction of political community. The academic literature
in (post) colonial studies has largely focused on how the institu-
tional arrangements and state apparatuses of the postcolonial
period resemble those of the colonial era. One of the fundamental
problems in postcolonial periods, however, is that the state form,
which is embedded in a colonial structure, clashes with a commu-
nity form that is based on cultural identity. As a result, the sources
of political disorder in the process of postcolonial state formation
stem not only from political hegemony or economic interest, but
also from conflicts among various social groups aspiring to different
types of political community. In this regard, as Partha Chatterjee
(1993) argues, we need to consider political community and the
state together in order to understand how they are mutually inter-
connected with each other. If we approach the postcolonial state
both as an institutionalized form of government and as a political
community, it becomes possible to explain the historical continuity
between colonial and postcolonial periods with respect to cultural
changes as well as institutional structures.
Like many other postcolonial societies, Korea saw a revival of a
colonial state apparatus, especially a coercive police force, through
the process of postcolonial state formation, although one of the
strongest popular demands for reconstructing postcolonial society
was the abolishment of colonial legacies. As we will see later, the
resemblance of the colonial and postcolonial state forms resulted
from the process of popular struggles in which people attacked fellow
Koreans, particularly those who served the Japanese during the
colonial period and were perceived as pro-Japanese collaborators. In
a reaction to popular social movements, centralized and coercive
state power was reorganized in a stronger form. This demonstrates
that various social groups pursued their rights through different
types of political community, and national identity and community
membership themselves became a crucial source of internal con-
flicts. To better understand the process of postcolonial state forma-
tion, therefore, it is necessary to consider not merely institutional
reproduction but perhaps more importantly the role of relational
changes in social boundaries and identities in reconstructing the
political community of postcolonial societies.
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Why Korea?
This article develops a case study of colonial and postcolonial
Korea, which provides important theoretical insights for the follow-
ing reasons. First, the investigation of Korean history elucidates the
impact of colonialism upon a national community. Compared to
other pre-colonial societies, Korea maintained a culturally homo-
geneous society before Japanese colonial rule (Duncan 1998; see
Em 1999). Indeed, the Choso˘n dynasty (1392–1910) exhibited
characteristics of what Anthony Smith (1987) calls an “ethnic com-
munity,” such as a collective name, common myth of descent,
shared history, distinctive culture, association with a specific ter-
ritory, and sense of solidarity.3 The demand for national indepen-
dence through the social movements in the pre-colonial era (e.g.
Tonghak Peasant Movement in 1894) and colonial period (e.g.
March First Movement in 1919) could be evidence of a national
community and a sense of solidarity. In fact, cultural and ethnic
homogeneity differentiates Korea not only from Western colonies
but also from Taiwan, another Japanese colony. Thus the Korean
case shows more clearly the effects of colonialism upon an already
existing national community.4
In addition, a case study of Korea can expand the scope of
colonial and postcolonial studies. While making significant theo-
retical contributions by uncovering histories of non-Western soci-
eties and the reciprocal relationship between imperial and colonial
societies, initial studies tended to focus on histories of Western
colonies. This led to a shift in theorizing based on the experiences
of Western European countries to those of their “Others” in (post)
colonial studies. Given the fact that Japan was a non-Western
colonial power, Japanese colonialism was generally considered as
an “anomaly” (Peattie 1984: 6–15) and, consequently, histories of
Japanese colonies such as Korea was doubly underrepresented. If
we consider that colonial rules by Western countries are divergent,
not uniform, and thus there is no essential characteristic of
Western colonial domination, then, Japanese colonialism can be
seen as one of the various forms of colonial domination, rather than
as an exceptional case. In this vein, it would be more constructive
to examine colonial practice in its particular historical context and
to compare similarities and differences among diverse practices of
colonial rule.
Moreover, as the case of Korea demonstrates, the distinction
between Western and non-Western colonialism is often blurred.
After all, Korea was first colonized by Japan, a non-Western power,
and after the brief liberation phase, the southern part of Korea
became occupied by the U.S., a Western power. To be sure,
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Japanese colonialism had some distinctive temporal and spatial
characteristics that are chiefly responsible for the particular traits
of Japanese rule, such as method of rule, institutional arrange-
ments, and colonial practices (Cumings 1984: 482). At the same
time, however, the U.S. occupation played a significant role in
shaping the structure of the subsequent postcolonial society. This
suggests that neither Japanese colonialism nor the U.S. occupation
alone can provide an adequate account of postcolonial politics in
South Korea; rather, it is the sequence of both super-imposed
foreign regimes that must be at the center of an analysis of post-
colonial politics. By exploring how this temporal sequence of colo-
nial rule and military occupation shaped postcolonial politics, we
can extend the spatial and sequential scope of existing studies, and
construct a preliminary foundation for comparative studies of colo-
nialism and postcolonialism.
To this end, this article examines the 1946 uprisings with par-
ticular attention to the creation and intensification of internal
conflicts among Koreans through the Japanese colonial era into the
American occupation period. Among the many studies of the 1946
uprisings (Cho˘ng 1988; Cumings 1981; Kim 1984; Kim 1998; Shin
1994; Sim 1991), Bruce Cumings (1981) provides one of the most
thorough historical accounts of the mobilization and of the
American occupation period in general. Against the AMG’s allega-
tion of the communist influence of the movement, he highlights the
voluntary and spontaneous characteristic of the uprisings and
claims that the movement arose from below with the help of grass-
roots associations, especially the people’s committees in local
regions. Some scholars, however, direct attention to the active
involvement of leftist activists in the movement and contend that
the uprisings should be understood within the historical context of
political and ideological conflicts. From this perspective, the upris-
ings were the product of the prolonged contentious relationship
between leftists, particularly the Korean Communist Party on the
one hand, and rightists and the AMG on the other (Kim 1984; Sim
1991). Integrating these different approaches, others argue that the
uprisings were a result of a partial combination of peasants’ eco-
nomic problems and leftists’ political interests (Kim 1998).
There is no doubt that these studies have contributed signifi-
cantly to our understanding of the 1946 uprisings. With attention
to the historical details, they have uncovered the actual process,
multiple characteristics, and the significance of the movement in its
own historical context. In spite of this rich literature, however, a
central question still remains: Why was the target of the movement
not the AMG but fellow Koreans? That people mainly attacked
fellow Koreans is especially puzzling when we consider the active
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role of the AMG in exacerbating the economic and political situation
during the occupation period. Furthermore, considering the inten-
sive casualties caused by the uprisings, it is surprising that not a
single American official was attacked throughout the movement.5
An American eyewitness indeed reported that “it was amazing to
recall again that despite our active involvement, no harm had come
to a single American. [. . .] They were merely settling their scores
with the men and forces which oppressed them under our rule, as
they did under the Japanese” (Gayn 1948: 388–89). To solve this
empirical puzzle, the following sections explore why and how
internal boundaries among Koreans that were produced and
rearticulated during the Japanese colonial period became reformu-
lated and intensified through the liberation phase and the occupa-
tion period.
Redefining Social Membership in the National Community in
the Liberation Phase
Since Korea became a Japanese protectorate in 1905, it had been
under Japanese colonial rule for four decades. Although decoloni-
zation resulted from the Japanese defeat in World War II, not from
an indigenous anti-colonial movement, the coercive colonial rule
led to the development of strong anti-Japanese sentiment among
Koreans. Thus the most important task in the aftermath of
Japanese colonial domination in Korea was to reconstruct an inde-
pendent nation-state by abolishing colonial legacies. To achieve
this goal, various political organizations and social associations
emerged at the local as well as national level. In fact, on August 15,
1945, the day that Japan’s surrender to the Allied Forces and the
termination of Japanese colonialism was officially announced, the
Committee for the Preparation of Korean Independence (Choso˘n
ko˘n’guk chunbi wiwo˘nhoe, hereafter CPKI) was formed at the
national level.6
At the center of CPKI were people from various political organi-
zations, including the Korean Independence League (Choso˘n
ko˘n’guk tongmeang), Korean Communist Party (Choso˘n kongsan-
dang), and New Korea Society (Sin’ganhoe), all of which played
important roles in anti-colonial movements during the colonial
period (Hong 1985: 72–91; So˘ 1991: 195–215). Despite the lack of
popular participation in its initial formation, the CPKI was able to
gain the legitimate political status of a national organization
primarily due to the fact that it consisted of anti-colonial activists,
including nationalists and socialists, with the exception of some
rightists who refused to participate in the organization. Indeed, one
of the first actions of the CPKI was to release political offenders who
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were arrested by the Japanese. Due to strongly persisting antago-
nism against Japanese colonialism in the liberation context, per-
sonal experiences of participation in anti-colonial movements
became more or less equated with proof of being a genuine patriot
(see Ch’oe 1987: 80–81).
The creation of the CPKI was immediately followed by the estab-
lishment of local branches. By the end of August, the CPKI had 145
branches throughout all thirteen provinces in Korea (Minjujuu˘i
minjok cho˘nso˘n, hereafter Minjo˘n 1946: 81). When the CPKI was
succeeded by the formation of the Korean People’s Republic
(Choso˘n inmin konghwaguk, hereafter KPR) on September 6, 1945,
most CPKI branches were replaced by people’s committees (inmin
wiwo˘nhoe) down to the village level (Cumings 1981: 270). The
common activities of people’s committees included organizing
various social groups, such as youth, peasants, and workers; main-
taining public order; and taking over and controlling lands,
factories, and property owned by Japanese nationals and the
Government-General of Korea. For peasants and workers, it was
perceived as their right to regain access to land and property, which
had been confiscated and exploited during the Japanese colonial
period, and to participate in the political process in the context of
liberation.
The characteristics and political orientation of the CPKI and its
successor, the KPR, are well represented by its platform and the
twenty-seven points of its administrative policies (Minjo˘n 1946:
83–85, 87–89). The KPR declared four main objectives: the estab-
lishment of an autonomous and independent state; adherence to
the principles and ideals of democracy; a rapid elevation of the
living standard of the people; and, cooperation with other demo-
cratic countries. The administrative policies of the KPR covered
more specific social, economic, and political directions for nation-
state building. It is worth noting that these policies contained the
substantial meaning of civil, political, and social rights as con-
ceptualized by T.H. Marshall ([1949] 1992): freedom of speech,
publication, assembly, fraternity, and faith; the enfranchisement
of all males and females above the age of eighteen; and, mainte-
nance of the living standards in accordance with the average
standard of living.7 In particular, maintenance of minimum wages
and the abolition of all exorbitant taxes and the usury system
clearly show efforts to alleviate the economic burdens of peasants
and workers.
Of particular importance is that while promising fundamental
freedoms and absolute equality among members of the national
community, including the complete emancipation of women,
these policies made it clear that those who had collaborated with
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the Japanese would not be considered members of the nation and
thus they would not have equal rights. According to the policies,
all property, including lands, factories, mines, railways, and com-
munication utilities, owned by the Japanese imperialists or those
who collaborated with the colonial power were to be confiscated
without any compensation, and to be given to peasants and the
state. As these policies indicate, pro-Japanese collaborators
became considered “national traitors” (minjok panyo˘kcha) and
they were denied the right to vote as well. This clearly demon-
strates that in the context of liberated Korea, “collaborators” with
the Japanese were not considered members of the national com-
munity, and the loss of this membership in turn nullified their
economic and political rights within the reconstructed political
community.
Reflecting this general perception, incidents took place that tar-
geted both remaining Japanese and Korean officials. Right after the
liberation, thirty-five Japanese were killed, injured, or attacked,
while more than two hundred Koreans, mostly policemen and
township officers, encountered similar opposition at the hands of
their fellow Koreans (Morita and Osada 1979: 14–15). Since there
had been strong antagonism against Japanese colonialism, it is not
surprising that people attacked Japanese officials and nationals.
What is significant is that people resented other Koreans who had
actively served the colonial power more than they did the Japanese.
Although the incidents against fellow Koreans occurred only spo-
radically and did not develop into major political upheaval in the
liberation phase, they clearly demonstrate the existence of internal
conflicts generated under Japanese colonial rule, which in turn
became seeds of social and political contention in the liberation
phase.
It should be noted, however, that the meaning of “collaborators”
was by no means clearly defined or demarcated. Japanese colonial-
ism lasted for almost four decades with a considerable degree of
social penetration of the colonial state, and consequently, all indi-
viduals and social groups had to interact with the colonial regime in
one way or another throughout the colonial period. In the liberation
phase, therefore, the term “collaborators” did not necessarily mean
anyone who served the Japanese during the colonial period. The
fact that some Korean officials who worked for the colonial state
played a leading role in people’s committees in a certain county or
township (Cumings 1981: 322) reveals that having a particular
social and political position in the colonial period itself was not a
sufficient criterion for defining collaborators. More important was
whether and how they benefited from the Japanese at the expense
of fellow Koreans. The ambiguous meaning of “collaborators”
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became clarified when various forms of internal conflicts became
intensified through the American occupation period.
The Intensification of Internal Boundaries under
the U.S. Occupation
The political effort to reconstruct a national community during the
liberation phase confronted a structural constraint in the form of
another foreign rule with the arrival of the U.S. in the south and
the U.S.S.R. in the north. If the primary goal of the AMG was
to effectively maintain political order, it certainly could have
utilized the already existing organizations and activists who were
committed to developing mass-oriented politics to the extent that
these organizations and associations were supported by the major-
ity of the population. Thus, cooperation with these organizations
could have enabled the U.S. to launch democratic political reform
more efficiently. Yet, the AMG was reluctant to recognize the politi-
cal authority and representativeness of the KPR or the people’s
committees. Instead, it revived the earlier colonial bureaucratic
system and filled any vacancies with those Koreans who had served
the Japanese before.
The AMG formed a close partnership with a conservative party,
the Korean Democratic Party (Han’guk minjudang, hereafter KDP),
which consisted mainly of landlords, businessmen, and bureau-
crats, who were unwilling to discuss issues of collaboration with
the Japanese (Sim 1984: 30, 32). Since the KDP primarily consisted
of dominant economic groups, its primary interest lay in maintain-
ing the existing system. The essential objective of the KDP, there-
fore, was to counteract leftist organizations and their political
hegemony. While the party had no specific policies or platforms
regarding the construction of an independent nation-state, its
manifesto made it clear that the first task of the KDP was to bring
down the CPKI and the KPR (Cho 1959: 144). Negating popular
organizations and leftist activists was KDP’s raison d’être.
When the Military Governor appointed eleven men for an advisory
council to assist the AMG, many of whom were conservative and
members of the KDP, the KPR claimed that “traitors” were helping
the AMG and that the KPR should be recognized as the only
legitimate government (Supreme Commander for the Allied Power,
September-October 1945: 179). Because the AMG had no clear
policy for the occupation, its primary task was to secure law and
order, and to maintain the status quo. Reforms that the KPR and
the people’s committees supported, such as land reform and the
redistribution of property, appeared so radical to the AMG that it
found them difficult to support. Furthermore, the fact that the KPR
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kept “republic” in its name, implying its governmental character,
made its relationship with the AMG contentious. Direct conflict
between the AMG and the KPR began to emerge when the AMG
announced in a press conference that it was the only legitimate
government in the south, thus undermining the political authority
of the KPR (Maeil sinbo, October 11, 1945).
The AMG’s basic policy from the beginning was to maintain the
existing colonial system. Although there was practically no specific
guidance and instruction offered to the American army for its
occupation rule in Korea, it was indeed instructed that the U.S.
forces would utilize Japanese governmental machinery and officials
until the development of its own government system (United States
Armed Forces in Korea, “History of the United States Armed Forces
in Korea,” hereafter “HUSAFIK,” volume I, chapter 1: 63). On Sep-
tember 23, 1945, the AMG announced that there would be no
change of landownership and tax rates. Regarding enemy property,
it made clear two days later that the AMG would take control of
property owned by the Government-General of Korea, and would
allow transactions related to the private property possessed by
Japanese nationals. This economic policy gave rise to conflicts
between the AMG and local organizations in many regions of Korea,
because people’s committees already had been playing a role in
governmental activities, including taxation and management of
land and property since liberation.
Just as the AMG denied the political authority of the KPR, it also
launched an initiative to dissolve people’s committees at the local
level, and to replace them with AMG officers and their appointed
Korean counterparts. During this process of reconstructing the
local governing bodies, conflicts erupted in many areas. In
Namwo˘n, a city of the North Cho˘lla Province, for instance, the local
people’s committee took over property, which had been previously
owned by the Japanese, during the liberation phase. Upon its
arrival in the region, the AMG demanded the property back from
the people’s committee and nullified its political authority. When
the people’s committee refused to accept these demands, Korean
police intervention promptly followed. Responding to the arrest
of five committee leaders by the police, about seven hundred
to a thousand people marched into and attacked the police
station. When American troops were sent to disperse the crowd, it
resulted in three casualties and about fifty injuries (Haebang ilbo,
November 25, 1945; United States Armed Forces in Korea, G-2
“Weekly Summary,” no. 10, November 11–18, 1945).
As the Namwo˘n case indicates, the AMG relied on the police and
military forces in order to enforce its governmental functions. What
is critical in this process is that through the intervention of the
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AMG, internal conflicts that had developed during the colonial
period became significantly intensified, as those who were per-
ceived to be collaborators made another alliance with the occupa-
tion power. In particular, a strong connection between the KDP, a
conservative party, and the police force was created through this
process. On December 27, 1945, the AMG enacted policies that “the
provincial governors were to call on the police to keep order” in local
regions (“HUSAFIK,” volume III, chapter IV, part one: 11). This
policy facilitated the cooperation between the national police force
and rightist political organizations to the degree that the members
of the KDP already obtained official positions at the provincial and
county levels with the help of the U.S. Seventeen out of twenty-one
county governors in the South Cho˘lla Province, for instance, were
KDP members (Cumings 1981: 155), and both the Director of the
National Police Department and the Chief of the Seoul Metropolitan
Police came from the KDP.
While rightists gained prominent positions as government offi-
cials, leftists wielded a strong influence on various organizations, in
part due to their commitment to popular demands for social equal-
ity and the removal of Japanese colonial legacies, and in part
because of their relatively well-developed organizational and mobi-
lizing capacity, which they had strengthened throughout the
colonial period. Although rightist organizations also proliferated
during the occupation period, mass organizations in general had a
close connection with leftists, whether they were radical commu-
nists or moderate nationalists. The Korean Communist Party, for
example, played an important role in creating labor and peasant
unions in November 1945: the National Council of Korean Labor
Unions (Choso˘n nodong chohap cho˘n’guk p’yo˘ngu˘ihoe, henceforth
Cho˘np’yo˘ng) and the National League of Peasant Unions (Cho˘n’guk
nongmin chohap ch’ong yo˘nmaeng, henceforth Cho˘nnong).
In particular, the peasant union had local branches in every
province, with a total of more than two million members in the U.S.
occupation area (Minjo˘n 1946: 167). The principles of Cho˘nnong
resembled those of the CPKI and the KPR. Its economic aims
included: the confiscation of all lands from Japanese nationals,
collaborators, and national traitors and the redistribution of those
lands to poor farmers; prohibition of arbitrary change of tenancy
rights by landlords and establishment of union bargaining and
contract rights; deduction of rents into one-third of the crop; and,
destruction of all usurious loan contracts. Its political goals
included: participation of farmers’ representatives in government
organizations; appointment of executive, judicial, and other impor-
tant officials through elections; and, supporting and forming close
alliances with urban labor movements (Cho˘nnong 1946: 101–05).
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As these economic and political objectives indicate, Cho˘nnong had
a reformist rather than revolutionary characteristic, in spite of the
active involvement of the Korean Communist Party.8 In response to
these leftist initiatives, rightist labor and peasant organizations
emerged in 1946 and 1947 respectively, the primary goals and
activities of which were to destroy their leftist counterparts and to
develop an anti-communist movement.
In short, the U.S. occupation provided both an opportunity for
and threat to different social groups. On the one hand, it was an
opportunity for those who had a strong interest in maintaining the
existing colonial structure, including dominant economic groups
and former colonial officials. On the other hand, it represented a
critical threat for those who attempted to remove colonial legacies
and construct their own independent nation-state. Consequently,
various groups had to adopt their own strategies by interacting with
the AMG differently, thus exacerbating internal conflicts that cul-
minated in the 1946 uprisings.
The 1946 People’s Uprisings
On September 17, 1946, three thousand railroad workers in Seoul
presented a petition to the Department of Transportation with six
demands, including a wage increase and food rationing, and
requested a response by September 21. Seven thousand workers in
Pusan walked out on September 23 with the same demands, and
railroad workers in Korea under the AMG went on a general strike
on September 24 (Seoul sinmun, September 25, 1946). More than
250,000 workers affiliated with Cho˘np’yo˘ng were mobilized for the
general strike that developed into a popular movement. In Seoul,
participants included not only about 30,000 factory workers, but
also around 6,000 white collar workers, 16,000 students, and 300
professors; in Taegu, one-third of the local population joined the
movement (Choso˘n yo˘n’gam 1948: 257–58).
The general strike in September was followed by the outbreak of
October uprisings. On October 1, Taegu became the center of
protest, where women and children went to the city hall to demand
rice, and sympathetic union workers gathered at the railroad
station. When the police fired into the crowd to disperse them and
killed a protestor, it fanned the flames of anger. The next day,
thousands of high school and college students carrying the dead
body entered the police station, released prisoners, and took
weapons. Protestors took over the police station and began to
attack policemen and government officers. U.S. troops arrived to
control the situation and accepted the students’ demands: approval
of the legitimacy of the strikes, immediate release of the arrested,
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and suspension of repressive tactics. The crowds dispersed and
martial law was imposed. In the North and South Kyo˘ngsang prov-
inces, thirty-seven towns saw the outbreak of uprisings from the
first to the tenth of October. The number of participants ranged
from forty to tens of thousands (“HUSAFIK,” volume III, chapter 4,
part two: 7–8). After the movement in the Kyo˘ngsang provinces,
uprisings took place sporadically in other regions covering all prov-
inces in the south until mid-December (see Figure 1).
The uprisings were crushed especially by the police force, which
caused extensive damage and casualties. It was reported that by
the end of October, forty-four police officers and forty-three civil-
ian casualties occurred in North Kyo˘ngsang Province alone
(Choso˘n ilbo, October 31, 1946). While there are no official gov-
ernment statistics about the extent of the uprising, reliable esti-
mates from scholars suggest that about two million people
Figure 1: Incidents of Uprisings, September-December 1946
Redrawn from maps of uprisings from Cho˘ng (1988: 190) and Cumings
(1981: 353) with their permission. Shaded areas indicate at least one
incident and black lines represent provincial boundaries
Colonial Legacies and the Struggle for Social Membership 337
© 2011 Blackwell Publishing Ltd
Journal of Historical Sociology Vol. 24 No. 3 September 2011
participated in the general strike and subsequent uprisings, and
that movement casualties for the entire period include more than
two hundred policemen and about one thousand participants
(Cumings 1981: 379).
Although people attacked police stations and government
employees throughout the movement, American officials never
became targets. When railroad workers organized a general strike
in September and submitted a petition with their demands to the
Military Governor, for instance, it could have developed into an
anti-AMG political movement to the degree that the employer was
the Department of Transportation. Instead, it caused a massive
physical confrontation between strikers cooperating with union
activists and rightist organizations, especially youth associations,
backed by the police. It was reported that about one thousand
union members were arrested (Choso˘n ilbo, October 2, 1946).
One might argue that attacks on police officers and bureaucrats
occurred as a result of the anti-government bent of the movement.
To be sure, the positive attitudes toward the U.S. that the general
public held turned critical against the AMG, and the 1946 upris-
ings took place as a consequence of the economic and political
policies implemented by the AMG.9 That the movement was fueled
by anti-U.S. resentment only, however, does not seem to sufficiently
explain several stubborn historical facts: first, not a single Ameri-
can official was attacked throughout the uprisings; second, people
who were not directly involved with the AMG, such as big landlords,
also became targets of the movement; third, the degree of antago-
nism and violence that movement participants employed against
fellow Koreans was too intense and ruthless to be considered an
indirect expression of anti-U.S. sentiment.
Military government documents describe the brutal methods
people used to attack fellow Koreans as follows. In Taegu, for
example, “faces and bodies of policemen were hacked by axes and
knives. The hands of policemen were tied behind their backs
and sharp-pointed slate rocks were then thrown at them until
they fell to the ground from loss of blood. This was followed with
dropping large boulders on their heads crushing them beyond
recognition. In Waegwan, the police chief’s eyes and tongue were
cut out with rice knives before he was beaten to death. And, in
Sangju, five policemen were severely beaten and buried alive”
(“HUSAFIK,” volume III, chapter 4, part two: 23). Even hospitals
in Taegu refused to treat wounded policemen (Haebang hu
sanyo˘n kan u˘i nambanbu inmin tulu˘i kuguk t’ujaeng 1949: 33).10
If the AMG itself was the ultimate source of motivation for
the movement, it seems unlikely that participants would have
utilized such brutal methods against fellow Koreans. In short,
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anti-government tendencies alone cannot account for the move-
ment’s intense violence and choice of targets.
Rather, policies implemented by the AMG fueled the sources of
people’s grievances, which culminated in the uprisings. Economi-
cally, the AMG introduced a free market policy and revived the
colonial practice of grain collection in spite of public outrage
directed at these practices. In doing so, it exacerbated economic
conditions enough to threaten subsistence levels for peasants and
workers. Politically, the occupation regime supported conservative
political groups and reincorporated those who actively served the
Japanese colonial power, while suppressing progressive activists
and voluntary social organizations. To achieve a more comprehen-
sive understanding of the uprisings, therefore, it is necessary to see
how internal conflicts were exacerbated through these specific
economic and political policies by AMG.
Korean police officers and bureaucrats became the main targets
throughout the uprisings not simply because they worked for the
AMG, but more importantly due to their past conduct and relation-
ships with other social groups since the colonial era. Pak Tu-p’o,
who was a teacher in Ch’ilso˘ng elementary school during the colo-
nial period and a resident in Taegu in 1946 describes his observa-
tion as follows (interview with author, May 7, 2008):
Later, I saw him [a police officer] sitting on the street. He was bleeding. It looked like
he had been beaten. Tens of people were surrounding him, [they shouted], ‘this guy
has burdened us. He should be beaten to death, he shouldn’t stay alive.’ Whether
men or women, they were cursing him. He was sitting on the street with his eyes
closed. He was active in the conscription and draft for the war during the colonial
period. [. . .] After liberation, collaborators [with the Japanese] like him ran away
and looked for a mouse-hole to hide themselves. But, they occupied high-ranking
government positions and police departments again after the U.S. came. Grudges
kept growing and growing.
Having no clear political orientation and policies, the AMGbrought
the colonial state structure back andmany government officials who
worked for the Japanese regained their positions under the U.S.
More than eighty percent of the Korean police force under the AMG,
for example, had served the colonial state (An 1988: 215; Henderson
1968: 85). Throughout the occupation period, the police force was
intensively utilized to oppress such organizations as people’s com-
mittees, labor and peasant unions, and leftist political groups. In
fact, it was Cho Pyo˘ng-ok, the Director of the National Police
Department and a member of KDP, who suggested that the AMG
should ban people’s committees and the KPR, while tolerating the
violence of rightist organizations (Cho 1959: 154–56).
Reporting police oppression against workers’ and farmers’ asso-
ciations and the prevalent use of harsh Japanese methods for
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prisoner treatment, the Department of Public Information of the
AMG in July 1946 noted that “the apparent recent increase
in police aggression and brutality has been carefully planned.
The pass word is ‘August 15 revenge,’ the idea being to mete
out vengeance to those who removed the Japanese police from
office last August [in 1945]” (United States Armed Forces in Korea,
“Civil Disturbance,” no. 2, [July 30, 1946] 1994: 187, emphasis
added). It is not clear whether or how systematically police aggres-
sion was planned. What is clear is that political oppression toward
popular demands and organizations took place at local as well as
institutional levels. Although the U.S. played an important role in
this process by bringing back colonial institutional settings and
personnel in the political field, the critical point is that the oppres-
sion was intensified by the active and voluntary intervention of
police and rightist political organizations.
Why did Korean police and bureaucrats initiate political oppres-
sion against popular associations and activities under the AMG? To
comprehend the voluntary characteristic of the police oppression
and the continuity from Japanese colonial into American occupa-
tion periods, it is crucial to understand the role of the liberation
phase. As discussed earlier, in the liberation phase, the most
important task was to eliminate colonial legacies and reconstruct
an independent national community. People’s committees in many
areas took over governmental administrative roles, and those who
worked for the Japanese and lost their people’s faith were largely
ousted. Yi Il-jae, a labor movement activist affiliated with
Cho˘np’yo˘ng and a participant in the 1946 uprisings in Taegu
recalls (interview with author, May 22, 2008):
[During Japanese colonialism], there was a Korean chief at the township office in our
village. When there were any kinds of disputes, he called for the police to break them
up. [. . .] He exempted those people he knew well from the forced draft [for the war
effort during the late colonial period] and instead forced others to go in order to
increase his work performance. Right after liberation, people hit him in the head
with shovels and threw him into a rice paddy. We thought that he was dead. But, he
then showed up in the town again and was reappointed by the AMG. Later, people
attacked him during the uprisings.
This statement illustrates how the internal conflict, which was
produced during the colonial period in the form of the relationship
between government officials and ordinary people, was intensified
through liberation and the later occupation period. In the liberation
phase, popular antagonism against the Japanese was largely
directed toward Korean officials. Upon U.S. arrival in the south,
they returned to their positions seeking their own survival and
reprisals, which in turn reinforced popular grievances and percep-
340 Jin-Yeon Kang
© 2011 Blackwell Publishing Ltd
Journal of Historical Sociology Vol. 24 No. 3 September 2011
tions of injustice. Indeed, a leaflet found in Paekch’o˘n reads “it is
our aim to remove the evil police who repress our true patriots,
vicious bureaucrats who exploit excessive food, and pro-Japanese
national traitors who are behind them” (Cho˘ng 1988: 217, emphasis
added). In this regard, one of the important roles of the liberation
phase can be found in the bridging of internal boundaries among
Korean people from the colonial through U.S. occupation periods.
The economic situation was as important as the issue of political
oppression in sparking the uprisings. Of particular importance
for understanding economic issues are the AMG’s “free market”
policies and subsequent implementation of the grain collection
program. As soon as the AMG launched its occupation activities, it
adopted free market policies and issued “Free Market Rice”
(General Notice, no. 1, October 5, 1945) and “Free Market” notices
(General Notice, no. 2, October 20, 1945). The primary goal of these
two notices was to remove all control and restrictions on the rice
market and on the sales of all commodities, thus stimulating trade
and economic production. The consequences of these free market
policies, however, were the emergence of tremendous inflation and
the disappearance of rice in the open market. Within one year after
the U.S. came, the price of polished rice increased almost three
hundred times and the average cost of food was one hundred times
higher than in the pre-war period (“HUSAFIK,” volume IV, chapter
6: 5, 27; Lauterback 1947: 237).
Facing a widespread shortage of rice, the AMG announced a
“National Rice Collection” (Ordinance, no. 45, January 25, 1946) in
order to secure food rations. Reviving the notorious grain collection
program, which had been practiced for the war effort in the early
1940s during the Japanese colonial period, the ordinance man-
dated that each farmer deliver all excess rice except for 2.25
bushels per person in each household. As the total amount of the
first rice collection reached a mere 13.6 percent of the originally
intended amount, the AMG issued the “National Food Regulation,
no. 2” on August 12, 1946, and changed the method for rice
collection. Unlike the preceding method, this regulation mandated
that each farmer deliver a certain amount of an assigned quota to
the AMG at a fixed price. Local boards became responsible for
allocation and collection, which consisted of police officials, village
elders, business men, and large landowners.
The free market policies and grain collection program brought
about contrasting results for different economic groups. While they
led to extreme poverty and hunger threatening the subsistence level
for peasants, landlords were able to enhance their economic power.
The problem with the forced grain collection was that it was
executed under exacerbated economic conditions, and the price of
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collection was less than twenty percent of the production costs (In
1949: 79). Describing the living conditions in the summer of 1946,
an AMG document noted that “there are large numbers of people
every day who come to the village office to ask for food. About 1,500
people are suffering from a growth on their skin, which is due to the
shortage of food and many of them have died” (G-2 “Weekly
Summary,” no. 43, June 30–July 7, 1946). In contrast, landlords
could escape heavy allocation through their close relationships
with government employees. The fact that quota allocation was
decided in local administrative offices seems to be chiefly respon-
sible for the assignment of heavy allocation for farmers. Since
the colonial period, landlords played a central role in local offices
and thus they could shift proportionate allocation to farmers.
When farmers submitted their rice to the government office, for
example, Korean clerks gave them only half credit for the rice and
assigned the remaining credit to the landlords (Gayn 1948: 414).
Landlords also actively used the situation to their benefit by lending
money to farmers at higher interest rates than during the colonial
period.11
The AMG’s economic policies significantly aggravated the already
insecure economic position of peasants who had suffered from
tenancy rights and high rents. To be sure, the AMG enacted a rule
that maximum tenancy rent should not exceed one-third of the
crop in the early occupation period. Due to the population influx
after liberation, which resulted in considerable surplus labor,
however, it was also possible for landlords to evade the ordinance
and force tenants to pay high rents as a condition of continuing
their tenancy rights. Indeed, from 1946 through August of 1947,
there were 1,552 tenant disputes in the North Kyo˘ngsang Province,
about eighty percent of which were related to the demand of con-
tinued tenancy (Kyo˘ngbuk yo˘n’gam 1948: 206–07).12 The economic
problems, which had existed since the colonial period, including
excessive rents, insecure tenancy, and usury, reappeared and were
considerably aggravated under the AMG.
It should be noted that landlords also played an important role in
the policy-making process. As the food situation was aggravated
after the enactment of the free market policies for rice, the AMG
called for an informal gathering and about twenty large landlords
were invited. In the meeting, a lieutenant colonel said, “though rice
began to be sold in a free market as you wanted from the outset, you
increased the price of rice. Even more, you don’t put rice out on the
market as the price control began to be in effect. The food problem
became extremely exacerbated and we even detected places for rice
concealment. Although we are willing to give you a last chance to
put rice out on the market and regulate the price accordingly, if you
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keep pursuing your selfish interest only and continue to exert a
harmful influence on Korean independence, we cannot but take
coercive resolution” (Choso˘n ilbo, January 10, 1946, emphasis
added). This statement reveals that landlords were directly involved
with the AMG’s free market policy-making process from the begin-
ning and sought to maximize their interest by manipulating the
economic situation.
Reflecting this economic condition, there occurred some inci-
dents in which people resisted landlords throughout the upris-
ings. When the protest took place in Yo˘ngch’o˘n in the North
Kyo˘ngsang Province, for instance, twenty landlords and twenty-
four police officers or bureaucrats were killed, and about one
hundred people severely wounded. Among the landlords, Yi
In-so˘k, the father of Yi Hwal, a leading member of the KDP, was
brutally attacked (Siwo˘l inmin hangjaeng 1947: 46). Compared to
bureaucrats and police officers, landlords had not been the main
target of attack during the uprisings. It is worth emphasizing,
however, that the political and economic elite tended to overlap.
During the colonial period, some Koreans who enjoyed dominant
economic status worked for local governing bodies. In fact, rep-
resentatives in the upper level administration (pu) included both
landlords and capitalists, and more than ninety percent of people
in the local offices (myo˘n) engaged in agriculture in 1931 (Cho¯sen
so¯tokufu naimukyoku 1932: 286–90). Since the colonial govern-
ment endowed electoral eligibility for local councils to people who
paid more than five yen in local taxes for economic property, it is
plausible to regard most local representatives as landlords. By
working closely with the colonial power, therefore, dominant eco-
nomic groups were able to maintain and expand their economic
interest and political power. The economic and political elites by
no means existed as a unitary group, and yet they were not com-
pletely disconnected either.
The cooperative relationship among landlords, bureaucrats, and
the police was reinforced during the occupation period, especially
in the process of grain collection. In fact, the Department of Public
Information of the AMG reported two months before the outbreak of
uprisings that village officials who were closely connected to large
landlords set grain quotas long before the harvest and worked with
police officers. When farmers refused to submit or complained of
unfair quotas to the local offices, they were jailed, whether they had
grain or not, and received bad treatment from police. Local
Farmers’ Associations did not receive any representative rights and
were subject to police raid. For many, “the police were no better
than the former Japanese police” (“Civil Disturbance,” no. 2, [July
30, 1946] 1994: 186).
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At that time, our living conditions were really bad because of inflation. After the
Japanese defeat, it was said that it became our world, but an official who served the
Japanese was still overbearing at the village office. That Korean official was like a
devil of a man in terms of rice collection during the Japanese colonial period. If
people did not meet the heavy allocation, the official made them kneel down when
it was raining and robbed their grain. People didn’t like that such a person was still
holding the same position even after liberation. The official was a wealthy farmer at
another village which was ten ri [about 2.5 miles] away from our village. Of course,
he made a good fortune because he worked with the Japanese.
The above testimony (Yi 1965: 230–31) shows how the forced
rice collection during the colonial period reinforced internal con-
flicts among the Koreans. Even though the rice collection was
implemented by the colonial state for its war effort, it provided
some Koreans with a chance to expand economic and political
power at the expense of their fellow countrymen. When the AMG
revived the grain collection program, and particularly after utiliz-
ing the methods that were more extractive and brutal, the inter-
nal conflicts among Koreans reappeared in intensified form.
The animosity against former colonial officials is evident in
the statement of Kang Ch’ang-do˘k, a low-ranking officer of the
Department of Agricultural Economy at the provincial government
office who participated in the protest in front of a police station in
Taegu on October 1. His statement illustrates a deep rooted
antagonism against former colonial officials and provides a clue
about the source of their anger. Reflecting on the events that
transpired the following day, he recalls (interview with author,
May 7, 2008):
On my way from work, I saw a lot of stuff piled in the street and people surrounding
it. It was a high-ranking government employee’s house, who’d lost favor with the
people during the Japanese colonial period. They searched his house and found a lot
of rice, sugar, and cotton fabric. This kind of stuff was really precious back then.
People didn’t take the stuff for themselves but put it in the street and shouted ‘see
this, now people are poorly clothed and suffering from hunger, and this son of bitch
is living well against the people.’ They cursed him and shouted he should be beaten
to death.
The incident took place after the police station was taken over.
Although it was more or less a spontaneous invasion against colo-
nial bureaucrats rather than an organized collective action with
clearly defined goals, it illustrates some of the sources of shared
hostility toward government officers who collaborated with the
Japanese colonial government and then the American military
occupation. In short, popular resentment stemmed from the fact
that people who prospered and protected themselves under the
aegis of Japanese power not only maintained their positions, but
344 Jin-Yeon Kang
© 2011 Blackwell Publishing Ltd
Journal of Historical Sociology Vol. 24 No. 3 September 2011
even increased their economic and political power under U.S. occu-
pation while the standard of living for most people was on the edge
of subsistence levels.
It seems that extortion by bureaucrats and police officers was
widespread. Noting that after the outbreak of uprisings in Taegu,
an average of three so˘k (about 143 gallons) of rice was found in
murdered policemen’s houses, an American observer stated that “it
was impossible that such a large amount could have been acquired
legally. Obviously, there had been a large-scale police shakedown
operating in the area” (Robinson 1950: 151). What is noteworthy is
not only that officials had a large amount of food when most people
were suffering from starvation, but also that movement partici-
pants did not take the food with them. As indicated in the above
statement, even in an unorganized and impulsive collective action,
people did not appropriate the officials’ property. Rather, they
directed their collective grievances and antagonisms towards those
who they felt did not deserve their powerful positions and who
prospered at the expense of fellow Koreans under the protection of
the U.S. Even though there is no doubt that a dearth of food
provoked collective grievances, hunger alone does not seem to
explain the deeper meaning and motivation of the uprisings.
To understand why people so vehemently protested against fellow
Koreans throughout the uprisings, then, it is critical to consider the
meaning of liberation. The following statement (Yi 1965: 230–31)
highlights what liberation meant for ordinary people.
After liberation, he [the colonial official] was maintaining the same living condition
as he had during the Japanese colonial period. People considered going to the village
office [during the uprisings] as a chance to revenge vicious grain collection. [. . .]
They destroyed the village office and put documents in the fire. Staff at the office
couldn’t stop them. Police officers and other officials ran away. People got excited
and went to the village where the target of their resentment, the vicious pro-
Japanese official lived. His house and assets were wrecked and burnt down. People
came back to the town after putting even his family treasure in the fire. That night
was like a village feast for them. Having home-brewed wine and turning red-faced,
they enjoyed their complete retaliation and triumph as if it had become a truly free
world.
For most people, liberation from Japanese colonial rule meant
the removal of colonial legacies and the reconstruction of their own
political community. In this regard, the uprisings can be considered
as a people’s response to their negated right to livelihood, right to
participate, and, most importantly, right to belong to their own
community that they had longed for since the colonial period. The
problem lay partly in the fact that the nationalist aspiration of
achieving an independent nation-state became identified by the
AMG with a communistic orientation. Also important is the fact
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that these demands and rights could be interpreted as the negation
of membership in the national community of those who had worked
for and prospered through Japanese colonialism.
The experience of the liberation phase, albeit brief, underscored
that “collaborators” with the Japanese had no economic, political,
and social rights in a newly-reorganized political community.
Although the meaning of collaborators remained relatively ambigu-
ous and subject to interpretation, what is crucial is that those who
served or benefited from Japanese colonial domination, and then
the AMG at the expense of other Koreans, suppressed the people’s
demands not simply because of the commands they received from
the Americans, but for their own survival. If internal conflicts
among Koreans took the form of “life-and-death” struggles during
the occupation period, as the 1946 uprisings indicated, this was
due to the internal exclusion that had been produced and rede-
ployed since the colonial period.
In sum, the significance of the uprisings lies in the fact that they
were pivotal events through which internal boundaries that had
been created during the colonial period became intensified and
reclassified under the American occupation. Since the colonial
period, internal boundaries had taken various forms, including
economic conflict between landlords and peasants, ideological con-
flict between liberal and socialist nationalists, and political conflict
between police officers/bureaucrats and peasants/workers. Despite
the existence of a general affinity across these boundaries, they
tended to coexist with each other and did not develop a clear
demarcation during the colonial and liberation periods. When inter-
nal conflicts were intensified under the AMG, however, the demar-
cation of boundaries began to emerge between those who sought to
reproduce the existing system, including dominant economic
groups, former colonial officials, and the AMG on the one hand, and
those who struggled against the attempts to revive colonial struc-
tures and practices, particularly peasants, workers, and leftists, on
the other. The 1946 uprisings were generated when these different
forms of conflict coalesced in a particular historical conjuncture.
The Aftermath of Uprisings
The repercussions of the uprisings on the subsequent political
landscape were far reaching. First, people lost their organizations
and the despotic colonial state structure was in turn revived.
Throughout the uprisings, voluntary social associations and politi-
cal organizations, such as people’s committees and farmers’ and
workers’ unions, which had already been under political suppres-
sion, were largely destroyed. In this process, the coercive state
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apparatus that had been nurtured under the Japanese colonial
rule, particularly the police force, reappeared in new form with even
more strength. In fact, an additional budget was assigned to
supplement and reinforce the police force in November of 1946
during the uprisings, and the annual expenditure for the National
Police Department increased about sixty percent in 1947 (Choso˘n
kyo˘ngje yo˘nbo 1948: 267). As a result, while Korean police officials
numbered about 10,000 for the entire area of Korea in the late
colonial period, they expanded to approximately 25,000 in the
south only in the aftermath of the uprisings in 1946, then to 45,000
right before the establishment of a separate government in South
Korea in 1948 (An 1988: 211). The enhanced police force was
brutally and effectively utilized for controlling subsequent popular
struggles against the establishment of a separate nation-state in
the south.
Another significant impact of the uprisings on the subsequent
political process is related to the fact that rightists largely secured
their positions in the institutionalized political field. From the
beginning, rightists tended to dominate official positions and
worked with the AMG more closely than leftists. Leftists, however,
had maintained relatively developed organizations and popular
memberships that they could more easily mobilize. When the first
general election under the U.S. occupation was held for the Interim
Legislative Assembly in late October, while the uprisings were
taking place, most of the prominent leftists were either already in
prison or driven underground to escape political oppression. In
fact, the prisoners in the south numbered around 22,000, which
was almost twice the highest number of convicts at any point
during the Japanese colonial period (Robinson 1950: 146). Conse-
quently, among the forty-five members who were elected, only two
members from the people’s committee were elected from the island
of Cheju Province, and a majority of the members were from rightist
parties. Although leftists continued to be more or less marginalized
since the arrival of the U.S., rightists secured and strengthened
their positions by effectively expelling leftists from the institution-
alized political field through the uprisings.
The significance of the election lay not merely in the under-
representation of leftists but also in the fact that both the proce-
dure and practice was far from democratic. The principal of
universal suffrage was announced and yet voices of individual
voters could hardly be heard. Indeed, “in hundreds of cases, the
village and county heads dispatched servants to the prospective
voters, asking for the loan of their name seals, which were then
stamped on ballots filled in by the officials” (Gayn 1948: 426). Even
though the Interim Legislative Assembly had a limited effect on the
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subsequent political landscape, an important consequence of the
first election was the alienation of popular voices and the elimina-
tion of divergent ideological ideas from institutionalized political
processes, thus developing an exclusionary mechanism that came
to characterize political structure in the south.
Conclusion
Understanding Japanese colonial rule in Korea is essential for
explaining the subsequent liberation and U.S. occupation periods.
While colonial rule was a threat to the Korean people as a whole,
various groups responded to and interacted with the colonial power
by using different strategies from which contentious relationships
among indigenous people were generated and rearticulated. In this
sense, a critical consequence of colonial rule can be found not only
in producing a structure of economic exploitation and political
oppression, but perhaps more importantly in generating and ampli-
fying internal boundaries among the indigenous people. Indeed, in
the aftermath of Japanese colonialism, there emerged significant
conflicts as a consequence of the incompatibilities between national
and political communities. The fact that collaborators with the
Japanese colonial power became identified as “national traitors”
and became the target of popular protests shows how the meaning
of social membership in a national community can be altered
through the historical experience of colonial domination. In this
regard, the social consequences of the colonial experience are
among the most profound colonial legacies.
The centralized state structure that the Japanese colonial power
introduced in Korea was reproduced in postcolonial South Korea.
The colonial state structure, however, did not immediately deter-
mine the form and characteristics of the postcolonial state. The
continuity from colonial to postcolonial was realized through the
historical process of liberation and the American occupation
periods. In fact, the strongly centralized state form could have been
effectively used as an institutional resource for developing a post-
colonial nation-state in Korea. The character of the postcolonial
state, rather, hinged on who utilized the colonial state structure
and for what ends. When right leaning conservative, whose legiti-
macy was significantly tainted, utilized colonial structures against
popular demands for economic and political reforms under the
aegis of the AMG as another super-imposed foreign power, the
coercive characteristics of the colonial structure were in turn
revived in a more transparent form. In this sense, internal bound-
aries were resurrected, rendered more visible, and thus constituted
powerful sources of political conflict during the liberation and
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occupation periods, the important consequence of which lies in the
pattern of internal exclusion that typified South Korea’s post-war
political trajectory.
Even though the ways in which Japanese colonial rule influenced
postcolonial state formation in South Korea should be understood
in its particular historical context, it provides a more general lesson
for understanding other postcolonial societies. Like South Korea,
most colonial societies underwent different forms of social and
political conflicts in postcolonial periods. In South East Asia, for
instance, India and Pakistan experienced a devastating civil war
because of their dispute over the national border and religious
conflicts. In many parts of Africa, tribal and ethnic divisions gave
rise to serious political eruptions. The implication of this analysis of
Korea lies in the claim that it is crucial to examine how the
historical experience of colonial domination produces and reshapes
sources of internal conflict, whether religious, ethnic, or class-
based, among indigenous people, and how such conflict in turn
plays a pivotal role in shaping a particular state form and political
trajectory in postcolonial societies.
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Notes
1 The movement has been referred to in different ways, including
autumn harvest uprisings (Cumings 1981), October people’s uprisings
(Cho˘ng 1988), Taegu October uprisings (Sim 1991), or peasant uprisings of
1946 (Shin 1994). Throughout this article, the movement is referred to as
the uprisings.
2 Just as the colonial state interacts with different indigenous
groups in various ways in a certain colonial society, an imperial power
can also have divergent forms of colonial rule in different contexts
(see Steinmetz 2007). In this regard, the particular characteristics
of a colonial state need to be understood at specific historical
moments.
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3 Smith rejects both modernists who argue that the nation is a purely
modern phenomenon, and perennialists who contend that nations and
nationalism have always existed throughout history. To overcome the two
perspectives, he takes the middle ground and suggests some continuity
between traditional and modern eras through the concept of ethnie or
ethnic community. Thus the existence of a sense of solidarity in the
Choso˘n dynasty does not necessarily mean that Koreans had developed a
modern form of nationalism in the pre-colonial period.
4 It should be noted that the term “homogeneity” here primarily refers
to ethnic and cultural dimensions. Therefore, the homogeneous character
of Korea in the pre-colonial period does not suggest that traditional Korea
had existed as an essentially harmonious collective entity without any
social conflict. In fact, the Choso˘n dynasty had maintained a hierarchical
social status system in which each individual belonged to a different social
category. In this sense, I do not share the nationalistic assumption that
traditional society had existed as an undivided and essential entity (see
Prakash 1995: 388–91).
5 Cumings (1981: 360) notes that a missionary was killed in Kigye, a
village of Yo˘ngil County in the North Kyo˘ngsang Province, which was the
only incident against non-Koreans throughout the uprisings. Cho˘ng (1988:
125), however, explains that rightist leaders and a Korean missionary, An
Kang-bok, were assaulted and found dead at the same place. It is not clear
whether the two missionaries are the same person or not. Even if they were
two different missionaries, and therefore there was a non-Korean casualty,
however, the point seems to remain valid that there were no major inci-
dents related to Americans during the uprisings and almost all attacks
targeted fellow Koreans.
6 This national organization was initiated when the colonial power
requested two prominent nationalists, Yo˘ Un-hyo˘ng and An Chae-hong, to
protect the Japanese and maintain public order until the Allied Forces
arrived, and was based on acceptance of the nationalists’ five conditions:
the immediate release of imprisoned political offenders; the guarantee of
food provisions for three months from August to October; no intervention
in any political activity for public security and state building; no interven-
tion in organizing students and youths; and, no intervention in mobilizing
farmers and workers for the construction of the nation-state (Maeil sinbo,
August 17, 1946).
7 Marshall classifies citizenship into three elements: civil, political,
and social rights. For Marshall, civil rights represent individual freedoms,
such as property rights, political rights indicate the right to participate in
political activities, and social rights exhibit the right to social justice. In
particular, Marshall (1992: 8) defines social rights as “the whole range from
the right to a modicum of economic welfare and security to the right to
share to the full in the social heritage and to live the life of a civilized being
according to the standards prevailing in the society.” In this sense, “main-
tenance of the living standards in accordance with the average standard of
living,” as indicated in the KPR’s policies, can be interpreted as pertaining
not just to economic welfare, but also to social rights of community
membership.
8 These objectives seem to reflect the view the general public held that
the construction of an independent nation-state should be accomplished
before any fundamental economic reforms. Indeed, when the AMG
announced a plan for the sale of Japanese-owned land solely to tenants
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with payment in produce in March 1946, a majority of tenant farmers
indicated through public opinion polls that the establishment of a “Korean”
government should be prioritized over any land reform, and only fourteen
percent of them favored an immediate land distribution by the AMG. Also,
regarding the Korean-owned land, eighty percent of respondents agreed to
its sale to tenant peasants, rather than free distribution (Robinson 1950:
85).
9 A survey of public opinion, conducted by the Department of Public
Information of the AMG in the middle of 1946 sampling about 8,500 people
in all provinces of Korea under the rule of AMG, indicated that for the
question concerning their attitude towards the AMG, 28% responded as
satisfied, 38% as dissatisfied, and 34% did not know how they felt (G-2
“Weekly Summary,” no. 50, August 18–25, 1946).
10 The Taegu Doctor’s Association demanded that the AMG “stop the
police from shooting the citizens. We will refuse medical treatment to
the police who shoot the citizens.” As doctors refused to treat the police, the
hospital was taken by the U.S. Army medical personnel (G-2 “Weekly
Summary,” no. 60, October 27-November 3, 1946).
11 While rural credit associations under Japanese colonial rule led
farmers to borrow money at a rate of twenty-four percent a year, landlords
requested rates as high as sixty percent (Gayn 1948: 414).
12 In 1947, the number of tenant disputes increased to 1,934 by
August, 1,552 of which were caused by tenancy issues. Although the AMG
implemented a “one-third” policy to alleviate tenants’ economic burden
from the demand for high rents by landlords, it was blamed for reinforcing
their landownership, thus enabling them to maintain their economic
power, which declined significantly during the liberation phase (Cho˘nnong
1946: 159).
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